Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge

Author: Kraay, K.J.

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 56, Number 3, 1 June 2002 , pp. 297-317(21)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge's influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian's claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 215 Huron Street Toronto, ON Canada M5S 1A1 E-mail: kkraay@chass.utoronto.ca

Publication date: 2002-06-01