Nonreductive Physicalism and the Causal Powers of the Mental

Author: Clarke R.

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 51, Number 2-3, 1999 , pp. 295-322(28)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Nonreductive physicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the causal powers that mental properties are held to carry on the nonreductivist's view and the causal transactions into which mental events are said to enter. My aim here is less than that of defending nonreductive physicalism against all of Kim's criticisms. I wish primarily to call into question the claim that nonreductive physicalism is committed to emergentism with respect to the causal powers of the mental. As subsidiary points, I shall offer a limited defense of nonreductivism against two related objections that Kim raises. However, even if my conclusions are correct, problems remain for the nonreductivist's treatment of mental causation. I shall close the paper with a brief discussion of these difficulties.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy University of Georgia Athens, GA 30602-1627 U.S.A.

Publication date: 1999-01-01