Personal Identity, Reductionism and the Necessity of Origins
Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 51, Number 2-3, 1999 , pp. 277-294(18)
Abstract:A thought that we all entertain at some time or other is that the course of our lives might have been very different from the way they in fact have been, with the consequence that we might have been rather different sorts of persons than we actually are. A less common, but prima facie intelligible thought is that we might never have existed at all, though someone rather like us did. Arguably, any plausible theory of personal identity should be able to accommodate both possibilities. Certain currently popular Reductionist theories of personal identity, however, seem to be deficient in precisely this respect. This paper explores some Reductionist responses to that challenge.
Document Type: Regular Paper
Affiliations: 1: School of History, Philosophy & Politics Massey University Private Bag 11222 Palmerston North New Zealand Fax: 64-6-350 5662 E-mail: R.W.Perrett@massey.ac.nz 2: Professional Development Centre (Policing) Faculty of Arts Charles Stuart University c/- NSW Police Academy, McDermott Drive Goulburn NSW 2580 Australia E-mail: email@example.com
Publication date: 1999