Minds as Connoting Systems: Logic and the Language of Thought
Authors: Rantala V.1; Vadén T.1
Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 46, Number 3, May 1997 , pp. 315-334(20)
Publisher: Springer
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Abstract:
The principal aim of this essay is to discuss some logical features of the so-called Classical model of cognitive architecture as it is advocated by J. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn in their much discussed article 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis'. It is pointed out that their structural assumptions have consequences of a logical kind which call into question the view that the Classical architecture (in their sense) can be employed to model human cognition. It seems that the consequences have escaped Fodor and Pylyshyn's notice, or else they have failed to appreciate them, since some of their claims evidently conflict with them. It is also investigated whether the human mind can be characterized as being logical in some weaker sense of logic. Furthermore, it is argued that J. H. Fetzer's view that it is a semiotic system is more realistic than the Classical model, but the distinction he suggests between human cognition and other kinds may be problematic.
Language: English
Document Type: Regular paper
Affiliations: 1: Department of Mathematical Sciences/philosophy University of Tampere P.O. Box 607 33101 Tampere, Finland
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