INDIVIDUALISM, INDIVIDUATION AND THAT-CLAUSES

Author: RECHENAUER M.

Source: Erkenntnis, Volume 46, Number 1, January 1997 , pp. 49-67(19)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Brian Loar has argued that the well-known arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind are insufficient because they rely on the assumption that that-clauses uniquely capture psychological content. He tried to show that this is not the use of that-clauses in philosophical psychology. I argue that he does not succeed in his argument. That-clauses sometimes capture psychological content, if our system of mental ascription is to be workable at all. I argue further that individualism tends to be at odds with a requirement of intersubjective shareability of contents and that Loar is alternative conception of psychological content is beset with difficulties.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Universität Bielefeld, Abteilung Philosophie, Postfach 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany

Publication date: 1997-01-01