Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts

Authors: Cooter R.¹; Emons W.²

Source: European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 17, Number 3, May 2004 , pp. 307-327(21)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In trials witnesses often gain by slanting their testimony. The law tries to elicit the truth from witnesses by cross-examination under threat of criminal prosecution for perjury. As a truth-revealing mechanism, perjury law is crude and ineffective. We develop a perfect truth-revealing mechanism, which exactly offsets the gain from slanted testimony by the risk of a possible sanction. Witnesses testify voluntarily under the mechanism. Implementing an effective truth-revealing mechanism requires a witness to certify accuracy by posting bond. If events subsequently prove that the testimony was inaccurate, the witness forfeits the bond. By providing superior incentives for telling the truth, truth-bonding could combat some distortions by factual witnesses and interested experts, including “junk science.”

Keywords: litigation; witness; truth-revealing mechanism; perjury

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:EJLE.0000028643.10059.9f

Affiliations: 1: School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California Berkeley, CA 94720, USA., Email: rdc@law.berkeley.edu, URL: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/CooterR/ 2: Department of Economics, University of Bern, Gesellschaftsstrasse 49, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland., Email: winand.emons@vwi.unibe.ch, URL: http://www.vwi.unibe.ch/theory/emons_e.htm

Publication date: 2004-05-01