Democracy, Sea Power and Institutional Change: An Economic Analysis of the Athenian Naval Law

Authors: Kyriazis N.C.¹; Zouboulakis M.S.²

Source: European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 17, Number 1, 200401 , pp. 117-132(16)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The present essay attempts to test the validity of the theory of institutional change based on the concept of property rights, in the remote historical setting of Classical Athens. The “Naval Law” introduced by Themistocles in 483-2 BC, established the institution of trierarchy to produce warships to face the Persian invaders. This reform led to the first attempt to define the costs and benefits of public goods in the field of national defense. Thus, institutional change in Ancient Athens, through an efficient arrangement of property rights and duties, had long-term consequences on economic performance, creating a new growth path and ensuring economic prosperity and social justice for more than 150 years.

Keywords: ancient Greece; public goods; property rights; institutional change

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Argonauton Str. 38221 Volos, Greece 2: Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Argonauton Str. 38221 Volos, Greece., Email: mzoub@econ.uth.gr

Publication date: 2004-01-01