A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information
Source: European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 14, Number 1, July 2002 , pp. 5-13(9)
Abstract:We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn.
Document Type: Regular Paper
Affiliations: 1: Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisbon, Portugal; CEPR, London. firstname.lastname@example.org 2: Toulouse Business School, 20 Boulevard Lasrosses BP 7010, 31068 Toulouse, France and GREI, Centre d'études Stratégiques, Université Mohammed V, Rabat, Morocco
Publication date: July 2002