An Economic Theory of Court Delay

Authors: Vereeck L.¹; Mühl M.²

Source: European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 10, Number 3, November 2000 , pp. 243-268(26)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Delay undermines the performance of courts around the world. Its implications and possible solutions, however, are not so widely understood. The assessment of the efficiency of delay as a rationing mechanism requires a general theory, which looks at the effect on the number of conflicts, suits, settlements and trials. The outcome is somewhat disturbing: delay may be socially beneficial, but the assumptions seem prohibitively strict. The policy implications are that court delay is best reduced via increases in court fees and improvements in legislative and judicial quality.

Keywords: Court delay; demand for trials; legal certainty

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Limburgs Universitair Centrum, TEW/ER, Universitaire Campus, Gebouw D, 3590 Diepenbeek, Belgium and Maastricht University, Faculty of Law, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands lode.vereeck@luc.ac.be 2: Limburgs Universitair Centrum, TEW/ER, Universitaire Campus, Gebouw D, 3590 Diepenbeek, Belgium manuela.muhl@luc.ac.be

Publication date: 2000-11-01