The Paradox of Leviathan: How to Develop and Contain the Future European State?

Authors: Josselin, J-M.1; Marciano, A.2

Source: European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 4, Number 1, January 1997 , pp. 5-22(18)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Using a constitutional political economy perspective, we study the paradox of government (how a limited government can stay limited) and the different ways in which systems of law try to solve it. We then provide a tentative application to a possible European state and assess the relevance of some member countries' constitutional and administrative law, if they were both to develop and to contain this European state.

Keywords: Constitutional political economy; administrative law; constitutional law; induction; public choice; systems of law

Document Type: Regular Paper

Affiliations: 1: University de Rennes I, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-Crefaur 2: University de Corse-Pascal Paoli, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-Greqam

Publication date: January 1, 1997

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