The Paradox of Leviathan: How to Develop and Contain the Future European State?

Authors: JOSSELIN J-M.¹; MARCIANO A.²

Source: European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 4, Number 1, January 1997 , pp. 5-22(18)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

Using a constitutional political economy perspective, we study the paradox of government (how a limited government can stay limited) and the different ways in which systems of law try to solve it. We then provide a tentative application to a possible European state and assess the relevance of some member countries' constitutional and administrative law, if they were both to develop and to contain this European state.

Keywords: Constitutional political economy; public choice; systems of law; induction; constitutional law; administrative law

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: University de Rennes I, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-Crefaur 2: University de Corse-Pascal Paoli, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-Greqam

Publication date: 1997-01-01

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• In this Subject: Economics ,  Law
• By this author: JOSSELIN J-M. ;  MARCIANO A.

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