Proving Arrow’s theorem by PROLOG
Author: Indo, Kenryo
Source: Computational Economics, Volume 30, Number 1, August 2007 , pp. 57-63(7)
Abstract:This paper presented a simple PROLOG implementation for Arrow’s Social welfare function (SWF). Arrow (Social choice and individual values, Yale University Press, 1963) proved that any SWF which satisfies a set of conditions IIA, Pareto, and unrestricted domain should be dictatorial. The PROLOG program can prove the theorem for 3-alternative 2-agent case. With a minor modification it proves a version of the theorem without the Pareto condition by Wilson (Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 478–486, 1972).
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: August 2007