Political exchange and the voting franchise: universal democracy as an emergent process
Author: Horpedahl, Jeremy
Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 22, Number 3, September 2011 , pp. 203-220(18)
Abstract:The expansion of democracy presents a puzzle for a rational choice theory of politics: why would those in power choose to dilute their power by expanding the voting franchise? In this article I introduce a new path of democratization, through mutually-beneficial political exchange aimed at securing collective-consumption goods. This political exchange path will produce a more constrained state than other paths to democracy, due to the subjective preferences of the two groups and the possibility of revoking the franchise. I briefly apply the democratization framework to the United State prior to the Civil War.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Harold Walter Siebens School of Business, Buena Vista University, Storm Lake, IA, 50588, USA, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Publication date: 2011-09-01