Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition

Authors: Klick, Jonathan¹; Parisi, Francesco²

Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 16, Number 4, December 2005 , pp. 387-395(9)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition.

Keywords: tax; federalism; harmonization; rent-seeking; commons; H20; H77

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-005-4319-7

Affiliations: 1: Florida State University College of Law, 425 West Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA, Email: jklick@law.fsu.edu 2: George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA 22201, USA,

Publication date: 2005-12-01