Credible Currency: A Constitutional Perspective

Authors: Selgin George¹; White Lawrence²

Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 16, Number 1, March 2005 , pp. 71-83(13)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

By contrast to private banks, public monetary authorities – central banks and currency boards – have limited credibility in making redemption or fixed-exchange-rate commitments. Their sovereign immunity obviates legal penalties for devaluing, and their monopoly status weakens reputational penalties. The softness of central bank promises invites speculative attack and currency crises. Privatization and decentralization of exchange-rate commitments provides a more credible currency by making redemption commitments legally enforceable and reputable. This contrast sheds light on (1) the breakdown of the classical gold standard and (2) the costs and benefits of dollarization.

Keywords: currency; credibility; monetary constitution

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-005-5853-z

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, University of Georgia, GA, 011USA, Email: selgin@uga.edu 2: Department of Economics, University of Missouri -- St. Louis, MO, 011USA, Email: lwhite@umsl.edu

Publication date: 2005-03-01