Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities

Author: Thomas Schwartz

Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 15, Number 4, December 2004 , pp. 383-389(7)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Conventional wisdom has it that the absolute (purely negative) veto is ineffective when overridable by a simple majority. That is flatly false. The examples that prove this surprising fact are themselves surprisingly ordinary yet oddly resistant to direct observation. They reveal virtues of a neglected institutional design.

Keywords: voting; veto; simple majority

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-004-7770-y

Affiliations: 1: Department of Political Science, UCLA, 4289 Bunche Hall, Box 951472, 90095-1472, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Email: frntdesk@polisci.ucla.edu

Publication date: 2004-12-01