Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions

Author: Salmon P.1

Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 12, Number 4, December 2001 , pp. 333-349(17)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The paper discusses the implications of three models of elections (the median voter model, the proportional representation model, and the probabilistic voting model) on three functions of constitutional rules (constraining the majority of the people, monitoring political and bureaucratic agents, and keeping separate the levels of constitutional rules and of ordinary politics).

Keywords: elections; constitutions; majority; proportional representation; probabilistic voting

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Université de Bourgogne, LATEC, Pôle d’Economie et de Gestion, 2 boulevard Gabriel, F-21000 Dijon, Francepierresalmon@compuserve.com

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