On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent-Seeking Approach
Authors: Casas-Pardo, J.; Montoro-Pons, J.D.
Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 12, Number 3, September 2001 , pp. 237-253(17)
Abstract:The aim of this paper is to extend the rent-seeking literature to the equilibrium selection problem in competitive coordination games, i.e., games in which more than one equilibrium exists, and individuals' preferences are opposed. We analyze alternative correlated equilibria: contractual agreements and legally enforced equilibria. The latter are to be understood as the outcome of rents-seeking contests in which players invest resources in order to set a norm. The contest is analyzed in its basic two-person setting and later generalized to the two-populations case. There we show that the outcomes depend on the relative payoff structure of the game, the technological properties of the contest, and the population distribution. Finally, the efficiency analysis focuses not only on the extent of the rent dissipation, but also on the comparative analysis of the inefficiencies that arise in the market (not coordinated) equilibrium.
Document Type: Regular Paper
Affiliations: Departamento de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Valencia, Av. Naranjos s/n, 4022 Valencia, Spain
Publication date: September 2001