A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy
Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 11, Number 1, March 2000 , pp. 5-25(21)
This paper provides a model of democratic government as a compound of independent elective and non elective ``centers of power'' that compete in fostering the demands of voters and of interest groups. The analysis describes how interests of voters and of pressure groups are represented and under what conditions the compound democracy is more responsive to voters' or to interest groups' demands. These conditions are shown to depend on the center of power's relative opportunity costs at serving a plurality of interests and on the severeness of informational asymmetries between voters and interest groups.
Document Type: Regular paper
Affiliations: 1: Istituto di Scienze Finanziarie, Università di Palermo, Italy, and CPNSS, London School of Economics, U.K. 2: Centre for Economics of Institutions, and Dipartimento di Istituzioni Politiche e Scienze Sociali, UniversitàRoma Tre, Via C. Segre, 2 00146 Roma, ITALY
Publication date: 2000-03-01