Constitutional Economics—Constitutional Politics

Author: Ackerman B.

Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 10, Number 4, November 1999 , pp. 415-424(10)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

Why does the treatment of American constitutional politics presented in We the People depart so radically from models of constitutional deliberation developed in the type of constitutional economics pioneered by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock? The paper defines three premises that account for the divergence, and concludes by proposing an inquiry into constitutional design that requires insights from both traditions.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520-8215, USA.

Publication date: 1999-11-01

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