The Executive Veto: Purpose, Procedure, and Paradox

Author: Schwartz T.

Source: Constitutional Political Economy, Volume 10, Number 1, March 1999 , pp. 89-105(17)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

American governments, federal and state, leave a gap in legislative representation: global majorities are practically silent compared with local ones. An executive veto can right the balance. But prevailing procedural designs are fraught with paradox. I offer a simple new design that avoids paradox, can be instituted without constitutional amendment, and enhances both legislative and executive responsibility.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Political Science, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472, USA.

Publication date: 1999-03-01