The Two Factor Theory of the Mind–Brain Relation

Author: Place U.T.

Source: Brain and Mind, Volume 1, Number 1, April 2000 , pp. 29-43(15)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinction between the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental, and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as the brain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mental states depend causally on and are, thus, ``distinct existences'' from the states of the brain microstructure with which `they' are correlated. It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity and its composition/underlying structure applies across the board. all stuffs and processes are the same thing as is described by a description of their microstructure. In all cases where the manifestation of a disposition extends beyond the ``skin'' of the dispositional property bearer, dispositions invariably depend causally on the structure, usually the microstructure, of the bearer.

Keywords: causal dependence; correlation; dispositional mental states; distinct existences; mental processes

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Thirsh, Nathycrhshire, England

Publication date: 2000-04-01

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