Teleosemantics Without Natural Selection

Author: Abrams, Marshall

Source: Biology and Philosophy, Volume 20, Number 1, January 2005 , pp. 97-116(20)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content (e.g. beliefs’ truth conditions) in terms of function in the teleological sense, where a function is constituted in part by facts concerning past natural selection involving ancestors of a current entity. I argue that it is a mistake to base content on selection. Content should instead be based on functions which though historical, do not involve selection. I sketch an account of such functions.

Keywords: belief; function; mental representation; naturalized intentionality; natural selection; teleology; wide content

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-0359-7

Affiliations: 1: Center for Philosophy of Biology, Duke University, Box 90743, 201 West Duke Building, Durham, NC, 27708, USA,

Publication date: 2005-01-01