Metaphysical realism as a pre-condition of visual perception

Author: Boulter S.J.

Source: Biology and Philosophy, Volume 19, Number 2, March 2004 , pp. 243-261(19)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In this paper I present a transcendental argument based on the findings of cognitive psychology and neurophysiology which invites two conclusions: First and foremost, that a pre-condition of visual perception itself is precisely what the Aristotelian and other commonsense realists maintain, namely, the independent existence of a featured, or pre-packaged world; second, this finding, combined with other reflections, suggests that, contra McDowell and other neo-Kantians, human beings have access to “things as they are in the world” via non-projective perception. These two conclusions taken together form the basis of “Aristotelian” metaphysical realism and a refutation of the neo-Kantian “two-factor” approach to perception.

Keywords: Anti-realism; Aristotle; Constructivism; Darwin; Evolutionary biology; Kant; Metaphysical realism; Visual perception in vertebrates

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:BIPH.0000024405.82013.34

Affiliations: 1: Field Chair for Philosophy, Westminster Institute of Education, Oxford Brookes University, Harcourt Hill Campus, Oxford, OA2 9AT, UK ( sboulter@brookes.ac.uk; phone: 01865 488566).), Email: sboulter@brookes.ac.uk

Publication date: 2004-03-01