A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture For Moral Reasoning

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In this Subject: Biology ,&nbsp; Philosophy
By this author: Bolender J.

Author: Bolender J.

Source: Biology and Philosophy, Volume 16, Number 3, June 2001 , pp. 339-356(18)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tiered architecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both of specialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automatically and effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose, cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in the light of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrasted with rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmides and Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued that a two-tiered architecture is more plausible.

Keywords: ambivalence; attitude; cognitive architecture; cognitively penetrable; inclusive fitness; informationally encapsulated; mental faculty; module; moral intuition; moral judgment; repression; strength of attitude; teleological