Semantic and Structural Problems in Evolutionary Ethics

Abstract:

In ``A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics'' (1986), Robert J. Richards endeavors to explain how moral `oughts' can be derived from the science of evolutionary biology without committing the dreaded naturalistic fallacy. First, Richards assumes that `ought' as used in ethical discourse bears the same meaning as `ought' used anywhere in science, indicating merely that certain results or behaviors are predicted based on prior structured contexts. To this extent, the moral behavior of animals, what they `ought' to do, could arguably be predicted by evolutionary biology as effectively as, say, molecular behavior may be predicted by chemistry. But after acknowledging that biological inferences to this limited sense of `ought' were never contested by Moore's naturalistic fallacy, Richard proposes to add to evolutionary ethics a decision procedure to determine which members of a set of predicted behaviors are those which truly ought to occur – in the genuinely prescriptive sense intended by ethical discourse. But the procedure which Richards fabricates for this purpose appeals to such alleged `facts' as cultural conventions and moral opinion polling, hardly a secure foundation for the sort of scientific ethics promised by Richards at the outset.

Keywords: altruism; evolutionary ethics; naturalistic fallacy; `ought' (semantics); Robert Richards

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, U.S.A.