Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense
Author: Robinson, W.S.
Source: Biology and Philosophy, Volume 12, Number 1, December 1996 , pp. 51-71(21)
Abstract:In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers' argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers' relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.
Document Type: Regular Paper
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, U.S.A.
Publication date: December 1, 1996