Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting

Author: Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin

Source: Pragmatics & Cognition, Volume 13, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 7-37(31)

Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company

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Abstract:

The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-repre­sen­ta­tio­nalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Frege's and Witt­genstein's original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theo­ries (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), con­ventionalism (D. Lewis), justificational theories (Dummett, Lorenzen) and, finally, Brandom's normative pragmatics.

Keywords: Absolute truth; cooperative practice; explicit rule; idealization; implicit norm; material inference; Platonism; pragmatic foundation of semantics; regularism; regulism

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.13.1.04ste

Affiliations: 1: University of Leipzig

Publication date: 2005-01-01

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