Formal truth and objective reference in an inferentialist setting
Author: Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin1
Source: Pragmatics & Cognition, Volume 13, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 7-37(31)
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
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Abstract:
The project of developing a pragmatic theory of meaning aims at an anti-metaphysical, therefore anti-representationalist and anti-subjectivist, analysis of truth and reference. In order to understand this project we have to remember the turns or twists given to Freges and Wittgensteins original idea of inferential semantics (with Kant and Hegel as predecessors) in later developments like formal axiomatic theories (Hilbert, Tarski, Carnap), regularist behaviorism (Quine), mental regulism and interpretationism (Chomsky, Davidson), social behaviorism (Sellars, Millikan), intentionalism (Grice), conventionalism (D. Lewis), justificational theories (Dummett, Lorenzen) and, finally, Brandoms normative pragmatics.Keywords: Absolute truth; cooperative practice; explicit rule; idealization; implicit norm; material inference; Platonism; pragmatic foundation of semantics; regularism; regulism
Document Type: Research article
DOI: 10.1075/pc.13.1.04ste
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