The freudian conscious

Author: Natsoulas T.1

Source: Consciousness & Emotion, Volume 2, Number 1, 2001 , pp. 1-28(28)

Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

To reduce the likelihood that psychology will develop in a deeply flawed manner, the present article seeks to provide an introduction to Freud’s conception of consciousness because, for among other reasons, his general theory is highly influential in our science and culture and among the best understood by clinicians and experimentalists. The theory is complex and all of its major parts have a bearing on one another; indeed, consciousness has a central place in the total conceptual structure — as is argued, in effect, throughout the present article. The discussion focuses mainly on how conscious psychical processes differ from processes of the psychical apparatus that do not instantiate the Freudian attribute of consciousness. This intrinsic attribute that belongs to every conscious psychical process is seen as including, along with qualitative content, an unmediated, witting awareness of the psychical process that is directed upon itself.

Keywords: Consciousness; emotion; unconscious; Freud; intentionality; psychoanalysis.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1075/ce.2.1.02nat

Affiliations: 1: University of California, Davis

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$38.49 plus tax      Refund Policy

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A