On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness: Further considerations in the light of James's conception
Author: Natsoulas, T.
Source: Consciousness & Emotion, Volume 1, Number 1, 2000 , pp. 139-166(28)
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Abstract:
How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as “feelings in William James's generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James's stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James's are intended to pick out the variable “width belonging to a stream of consciousness as it flows. Attention to this proposed property brings me to a discussion of (a) the unitary character of each of the states of consciousness however complex they may frequently be and (b) how to conceive of their complexity without recourse to a misleading spatial metaphor.Keywords: consciousness; feeling; self; ego; unconscious; stream of consciousness; intentionality
Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ce.1.1.08nat
Affiliations: 1: University of California, Davis
Publication date: 2000-09-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Psychology
- By this author: Natsoulas, T.

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