Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism

Author: Brueckner, Anthony

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 71, Number 2, September 2005 , pp. 384-391(8)

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society

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Abstract:

Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.

Document Type: Research article

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