Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism

Author: Comesana, Juan

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 71, Number 2, September 2005 , pp. 367-383(17)

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society

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Abstract:

In this paper I argue that McDowell's brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a "highest common factor" between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where "warrant" is understood as whatever has to be added to true belief to yield knowledge).

Document Type: Research article

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