Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome

Author: Schroeder, Timothy

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 71, Number 1, July 2005 , pp. 106-123(18)

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society

Buy & download fulltext article:

The full text article is not available for purchase.

The publisher only permits individual articles to be downloaded by subscribers.

Abstract:

Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual?s tic as on a moral par with others? actions. In this paper, I examine the options and argue that, if this is correct, then a surprising consequence follows: the standard, motivation-based theory of desire must be false. I go on to argue that, given what is known about the neurological basis of Tourette syndrome, this is a reasonable conclusion to draw.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2005-07-01

More about this publication?

This journal is now published by Blackwell Publishing. Current issues of this journal are available from here . Backfile content is in the process of being reloaded by Blackwell, and will shortly be removed from this page and available only from the Blackwell link above. If you have any queries about continued access to this journal please contact mailto:onlinehelp@oxon.blackwellpublishing.com.
Information for Authors
Subscribe to this Title
ingentaconnect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites