The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism
Author: Double, Richard
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 69, Number 2, September 2004 , pp. 411-422(12)
Publisher: International Phenomenological Society
Abstract:
Adopting meta-level Free Will Subjectivism is one among several ways to maintain that persons never experience moral freedom in their choices. The other ways of arguing against moral freedom I consider are presented by Saul Smilansky, Ted Honderich, Bruce Waller, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom. In this paper, without arguing for the acceptance of free will subjectivism, I argue that subjectivism has some moral and theoretical advantages over its kindred theories.Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2004-09-01
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