Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence
Author: Markie P.J.
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 68, Number 3, 1 May 2004 , pp. 530-553(24)
Publisher: International Phenomenological Society
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Abstract:
How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, "[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to - being appeared to greenly, say - is evidence for the proposition that I see something green?" Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belief's being true, our having good reason to believe in such a connection, the proper functioning of our faculties, and objective epistemic norms. A superior view, developed here, is that our experience of being appeared to greenly evidences for us that something is green because we have learned to identify green objects by experiences of that sort. Our learning to do so amounts to our adopting an epistemic norm directing us to form that belief on the basis of that experience.Document Type: Research article
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