Rule-Following and Externalism

Author: Miller, Alexander

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1 January 2004, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 127-140(14)

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Abstract:

John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: January 1, 2004

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