Kantian Morals and Humean Motives
Author: Clark P.
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 68, Number 1, 1 January 2004 , pp. 109-126(18)
Publisher: International Phenomenological Society
Abstract:
The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2004-01-01
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