Spinoza's Proof of Necessitarianism
Author: Koistinen O.
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 67, Number 2, 1 September 2003 , pp. 283-310(28)
Publisher: International Phenomenological Society
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Abstract:
This paper consists of four sections. The first section considers what the proof of necessitarianism in Spinoza's system requires. Also in the first section, Jonathan Bennett's (1984) reading of 1p16 as involving a commitment to necessitarianism is presented and accepted. The second section evaluates Bennett's suggestion how Spinoza might have been led to conclude necessitarianism from his basic assumptions. The third section of the paper is devoted to Don Garrett's (1991) interpretation of Spinoza's proof. I argue that Bennett's and Garrett's interpretations of Spinoza's necessitarianism have short-comings which justify an attempt to offer an alternative proof. In the proof given in the fourth section, it is argued that Spinoza derived necessitarianism from the conjunction of the following principles: (i) necessary existence of the substances; (ii) substance-property ontology; (iii) superessentialism; and (iv) the 'no shared attribute' thesis.Document Type: Research article
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