Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

Author: Gillett C.

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 66, Number 3, 1 May 2003 , pp. 709-717(9)

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society

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Abstract:

Foundationalist, Coherentist, Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating, chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Infinitism"—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology.

Document Type: Commentary

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