What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking

Author: McGrath M.

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 66, Number 3, 1 May 2003 , pp. 666-688(23)

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society

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Abstract:

The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2003-05-01

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