Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy

Authors: Daniel; Howard-Snyder F.

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 66, Number 2, 1 March 2003 , pp. 304-327(24)

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society

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Abstract:

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2003-03-01

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