Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience

Author: Sider T.

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 66, Number 1, 1 January 2003 , pp. 139-149(11)

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society

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Abstract:

A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical supervenience by Trenton Merricks. The argument assumes that consciousness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic.

Document Type: Commentary

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