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The Via Negativa: Not the Way to Physicalism

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A recent defense of the causal argument for physicalism is to defune the physical in terms of the non-mental. This move is designed to defuse Hempel's dilemma, one version of which is taken to the problem that the physical cannot be successfully defined in terms of either present-day or a future completed physics. I argue that the inductive support offered for this non-mental move simply begs the question for physicalism.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Physics and Astronomy Wheaton College, Wheaton, USA

Publication date: 2010-01-01

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