Skip to main content

Mirroring, Mind-reading and Smart Behaviour-reading

Buy Article:

$17.83 plus tax (Refund Policy)

This paper examines the claim that mirror neuron activity is the mechanism by which we come to know about the action-related intentions of others (e.g. Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996), i.e. that they are a mechanism for 'mind-reading'. I agree with recent authors (e.g. Hickok, 2008; Jacob, 2008) who reject this view but nevertheless I argue that mirror neurons may still have a role to play in the ways in which we understand one another (social cognition). If we adopt a certain kind of pluralism about social cognition then the mirror neuron system could play a role in social cognition even if it provides no access to the minds of others at all. I argue for this view and consider what the approach might entail for the ontology of the mirror neuron system.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Article Media
No Metrics

Keywords: associationist learning; behaviour; mind-reading; mirror neurons; nativism; social cognition

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Reading Centre for Cognition Research, Philosophy Department, University of Reading, UK., Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 01 January 2017

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more