Self-Knowledge and Consciousness of Attitudes
Suppose we know our own attitudes, e.g. judgments and decisions, only by unconsciously interpreting ourselves. Would this undermine the assumption that there are conscious attitudes? Carruthers (2011) has argued that if the mentioned view of selfknowledge is combined with either of the two most common approaches to consciousness, i.e. the higher-order state account (Rosenthal, 1997; 2005; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000) or the global workspace theory (Baars, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001), then the conjunction of these theories implies that there are no conscious attitudes. I shall show that Carruthers' argument against the existence of conscious attitudes doesn't succeed, and mention studies on autism and logical reasoning under cognitive load that suggest that there are conscious attitudes.
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Document Type: Research Article
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Publication date: 01 January 2014