A Representationalist Argument Against Contemporary Panpsychism

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Abstract:

Contemporary panpsychists, such as Lockwood (1991; 1993), Rosenberg (1999; 2004), and Maxwell (2002), argue that not only is the intrinsic nature of all physical matter phenomenal, but that this is so because the physical depends on the phenomenal.Most of us, including contemporary panpsychists, also acknowledge that our phenomenal experiences are, in some sense, representational. The aim of this paper is to use this well-conceded point that our phenomenal experiences are representational to cast doubt on contemporary panpsychism.

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Email: raamy@yahoo.com

Publication date: January 1, 2013

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