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Who's on First? Living situations and lived experience

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This paper is a discussion of Claire Petitmengin and Michel Bitbol's (hereafter P&B) article 'The validity of first-person descriptions as authenticity and coherence' (2009). In section I, I present what I take as being the main points they defend in that article, and put them in relation with the global purpose of the special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies in which their article is included. In section II, I start discussing the paper by comparing the conception of (first-person) description they defend with a constructivist/pragmatist account of description and knowledge. This leads me, in section III, to introduce very briefly the pragmatist (Deweyan) conception of experience that underlies that latter account. As that pragmatist conception of experience insists on the fact that lived experience goes beyond the subjective/objective duality, and as it therefore calls for a redefinition of what lived experience is, I naturally wonder whether B&P might endorse that pragmatist conception of experience, somehow standing in tension with the importance of subjectivity in the definition of what lived experience is for many first-person approaches to lived experience.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Universite de Technologie de Compi├Ęgne COSTECH / Cognitive Research and Enaction Design

Publication date: 2011-01-01

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