The Epistemological Status of Transpersonal Psychology The Data-Base Argument Revisited
Abstract:The present paper argues that neither the autophenomenological (naïve objectivism) nor the heterophenomenological (reported data) approach works in order to do justice to the reality of experiences, because neither approach escapes phenomenological scepticism. By regarding the potentials of neuroscience and transpersonal psychology in addition to analysing the epistemology of experiencing, it is argued that an interdisciplinary-transpersonal psychological method is preferable that covers first- second- and third-person accounts. Furthermore, it is argued that, in order to make such an approach fruitful for interdisciplinary research, a pragmatic view of reality that takes experiences seriously is needed .
Keywords: Autophenomenology; Noised; epistemology; experiences; extended or flexible ontological naturalism; first-, second-, third-person accounts; heterophenomenology; minimalist ontological naturalism
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: 1: Institute for Transcultural Health, Sciences, European University Viadrina, Groe Scharrnstr. 59, D-15230 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany., Email: firstname.lastname@example.org 2: Email: email@example.com
Publication date: January 1, 2010