Must Phenomenology Rest on Paradox?: Implications of Methodology-Limited Theories
Husserlian phenomenology depends upon a particular and limited set of related methodologies, which assume not merely abilities and results on the part of phenomenologists which have been severely criticized, but more profoundly, that mental contents are atomistic and independently manipulable. I will show not only that this assumption is mistaken and that questioning it undermines traditional phenomenological method, but that it leads to a paradox when turned upon itself which forces the rejection of a purely Husserlian phenomenology. More generally, any theory whose data is confined to the results of particular and limited methodologies is by that fact unable to investigate those methodologies, and is thus at best only able to function in a severely restricted realm.
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Neurology Department, University of Rochester, c/o 14 Selden St. Rochester, NY 14605 USA., Email: [email protected]
Publication date: 2008-01-01