Does Phenomenology Overflow Access?

Author: Levy, Neil1

Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 15, Number 7, 2008 , pp. 29-38(10)

Publisher: Imprint Academic

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Abstract:

Ned Block has influentially distinguished two kinds of consciousness, access and phenomenal consciousness. He argues that these two kinds of consciousness can dissociate, and therefore we cannot rely upon subjective report in constructing a science of consciousness. I argue that none of Block's evidence better supports his claim than the rival view, that access and phenomenal consciousness are perfectly correlated. Since Block's view is counterintuitive, and has wildly implausible implications, the fact that there is no evidence that better supports it than the rival view should lead us to reject it.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia., Email: levy@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

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