Skip to main content

Does Phenomenology Overflow Access?

Buy Article:

$27.68 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Ned Block has influentially distinguished two kinds of consciousness, access and phenomenal consciousness. He argues that these two kinds of consciousness can dissociate, and therefore we cannot rely upon subjective report in constructing a science of consciousness. I argue that none of Block's evidence better supports his claim than the rival view, that access and phenomenal consciousness are perfectly correlated. Since Block's view is counterintuitive, and has wildly implausible implications, the fact that there is no evidence that better supports it than the rival view should lead us to reject it.

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, Parkville 3010, Australia., Email: levy@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Publication date: January 1, 2008

imp/jcs/2008/00000015/00000007/art00002
dcterms_title,dcterms_description,pub_keyword
6
5
20
40
5

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
ingentaconnect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more