New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation

Author: Meixner, Uwe

Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, 2008 , pp. 17-38(22)

Publisher: Imprint Academic

Buy & download fulltext article:

OR

Price: $29.34 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the Libet-experiment. The necessary condition for the existence of free agency is that the physical macro-world is indeterministic to a degree that is relevant for living beings, that is, for their survival and well-being. From an evolutionary point of view, and on the basis of the facts of consciousness, it is more likely than not that this condition is in fact fulfilled.

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Institute of Philosophy, University of Regensburg, D-93040 Regensburg, Germany., Email: uwe.meixner@psk.uni-regensburg.de

Publication date: January 1, 2008

Related content

Tools

Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content

Text size:

A | A | A | A
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages. print icon Print this page