New Perspectives for a Dualistic Conception of Mental Causation

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In this Subject: Psychology ,&nbsp; Political Science
By this author: Meixner, Uwe

Author: Meixner, Uwe

Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, 2008 , pp. 17-38(22)

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Abstract:

The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the Libet-experiment. The necessary condition for the existence of free agency is that the physical macro-world is indeterministic to a degree that is relevant for living beings, that is, for their survival and well-being. From an evolutionary point of view, and on the basis of the facts of consciousness, it is more likely than not that this condition is in fact fulfilled.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Institute of Philosophy, University of Regensburg, D-93040 Regensburg, Germany., Email: uwe.meixner@psk.uni-regensburg.de

Publication date: 2008-01-01